This paper presents declarative semantics of possibly inconsistent disjunctive logic programs. We introduce the paraconsistent minimal and stable model semantics for extended disjunctive programs, which can distinguish inconsistent information from others in a program. These semantics are based on lattice-structured multi-valued logics, and are characterized by a new xpoint semantics of extended disjunctive programs. Applications of the paraconsistent semantics for reasoning in inconsistent programs are also presented.
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Introduction
Representing and reasoning with incomplete information in a program is one of the central issues in recent studies of logic programming. Extended disjunctive programs introduced by Gelfond and Lifschitz [15] provide a fairly general framework for that purpose. An extended disjunctive program can specify incomplete information by using classical negation as well as disjunctions in a program. In the presence of such explicit negation in a program, however, an extended disjunctive program possibly becomes inconsistent, since negative consequences are allowed in the program. In [15] , a declarative semantics of extended disjunctive programs is given by the notion of answer sets, which is a generalization of stable models of normal disjunctive programs. However, the problem of the answer set semantics is that the answer set becomes trivial in an inconsistent program and implies every formula from the program. This is also the case for most of the traditional logic programming semantics in which local inconsistency might spoil the whole program. Practically speaking, when we build a large scale of knowledge base in logic programming framework, inconsistent information as well as incomplete information is likely to happen in a knowledge base. In such a knowledge base, a piece of contradictory information would make the whole program inconsistent, but still the program may contain meaningful information which is not aected by the local inconsistency.
The paraconsistent logics are logics which are not destructive in the presence of inconsistent information. In these logics, the contradictory statement A^:A does not deduce an arbitrary formula, hence would not trivialize the whole theory. In this regard, paraconsistent logics have an eect to localize inconsistent information in a theory and serve as useful inference tools in articial intelligence. Historically, paraconsistent logics have been developed in the area of philosophical logic [1] , and a formal framework for inconsistent theories was given by da Costa [7] . Applications of paraconsistent logics to logic programming have also been investigated by several researchers. Blair and Subrahmanian [5] rstly introduced a framework of paraconsistent logic programming. They extended Fitting's three-valued semantics of logic programming [11] and developed a theory for possibly inconsistent logic programs using Belnap's four-valued logic [4] . The result was generalized by Subrahmanian [32] to programs possibly containing disjunctive information. Recently, the paraconsistent logic programming framework is further extended to treat default negation along with explicit negation in a program [28, 35, 21, 17] . However, in the context of extended disjunctive programs, a suitable paraconsistent extension of the answer set semantics has not been studied in the literature.
In this paper, we present declarative semantics of possibly inconsistent ex-tended disjunctive programs. We introduce the paraconsistent minimal and stable model semantics for extended disjunctive programs, which can distinguish inconsistent information from others in a program. The proposed semantics are based on lattice-structured multi-valued logics, and are characterized by a new xpoint semantics of extended disjunctive programs. We also present applications of the paraconsistent semantics for reasoning in inconsistent programs. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we rst present the paraconsistent minimal model semantics for positive extended disjunctive programs. We introduce a new xpoint semantics and characterize the paraconsistent minimal model semantics of positive extended disjunctive programs. The result is extended in Section 3 to the paraconsistent stable model semantics for extended disjunctive programs. A xpoint characterization of the paraconsistent stable model semantics is also presented. In Section 4, we address applications of the paraconsistent stable model semantics for reasoning with inconsistency. The notions of preferred stable models, suspicious stable models, and semi-stable models are introduced as variants of the paraconsistent stable model semantics. Section 5 discusses comparison with related work, and Section 6 concludes this paper. In this section, a program means a positive extended disjunctive program unless stated otherwise. As usual, we semantically identify a program with its ground program, which is the possibly innite set of all ground clauses from the program. In this paper, when no confusion arises, we identify a set of literals I with its interpretation I(L) for each L 2 I. For instance, we identify I = fLg with I(L) = t; I = fL; :Lg with I(L) = >; I = ; with I(L) = ? for any L 2 L P , and so on. Satisfaction (denoted by j=) of each clause in a program P is inductively dened as follows.
Denition 2.1 Let P be a positive extended disjunctive program and I be an interpretation. Then, In this section, we introduce a new xpoint semantics of positive extended disjunctive programs to characterize the paraconsistent minimal model semantics presented in the previous section. In contrast to logic programs containing only denite information, a positive extended disjunctive program has multiple pminimal models in general. In order to characterize such non-deterministic behavior of disjunctive programs, we rst introduce a closure operator which acts over the lattice of sets of Herbrand interpretations 2 2 L P .
Denition 2.2 Let P be a positive extended disjunctive program and I be a set of interpretations. Then a mapping T P : 2 2 L P ! 2 2 L P is dened as
where the mapping T P : 2 L P ! 2 2 L P is dened as follows: T P " 0 = f;g;
T P " n + 1 = T P (T P " n); T P " ! = S <! T n<! T P " n; where n is a successor ordinal and ! is a limit ordinal.
The above denition means that at the limit ordinal ! the closure retains interpretations which are persistent in the preceding iterations. That is, for any interpretation I in T P " !, there is an ordinal smaller than ! such that, for every n ( n < !), I is included in T P " n. Such a closure denition is also used in [9, 33] for computing stable models of normal logic programs.
Theorem 2.4 T P " ! is a xpoint. Proof. When I 2 T P " !, suppose that there is no interpretation J in T P " ! such that I 2 T P (fJg). In this case, for any there is some n ( n < !) such that J is not included in T P " n. Then I 6 2 T P " n + 1. This contradicts the fact that I 2 T P " !. Thus, J 2 T P " !, so I 2 T P (T P " !). Conversely, if I 2 T P (T P " !), there is an interpretation J in T P " ! such that I 2 T P (fJg). Then J is included in any T P " n for n < ! by denition. Thus I 2 T P " n for any + 1 n < !. Hence, I 2 T P " !. where T P " ! = T P " 3.
In the above example, the interpretation fc; :d; a; bg in T P " 3 is pruned in T P " 4 by the integrity constraint a^b, while the same interpretation is also generated from fc; :d; ag and fc; :d; bg in T P " 3, hence fc; :d; a; bg remains in T P " 4.
By denition, the xpoint closure presented above exists for any program and is uniquely determined. Intuitively, the xpoint characterizes a set of interpretations which are \generated" in a program by starting from the empty interpretation. Next we show that the xpoint closure in fact contains what we want, i.e., the set of all p-minimal models. Theorem 2.7 Let P be a positive extended disjunctive program and PMM P be the set of all p-minimal models of P . Then, PMM P = min((T P " !)) :
Proof. By denition and Lemma 2.5, each element in (T P " !) is a model of P . Thus, each element in min((T P " !)) is a p-minimal model of P . On the other hand, let I be a p-minimal model of P . Then, for each literal L in I, there is a ground clause L 1 _ . . . _ L l L l+1^. . .^L m from P such that fL l+1 ; . . . ; L m g I and L = L i for some i (1 i l) (by Lemma 2.6). Then, by the denition of the xpoint construction, I is included in T P " !. Since each element in (T P " !) is a model of P , I is also included in min((T P " !)). For positive extended logic programs, the following result holds.
Corollary 2.8 Let P be a positive extended logic program. Then T P " ! contains the unique p-least model of P .
The above corollary corresponds to Blair and Subrahmanian's xpoint semantics of paraconsistent logic programs [5] , and also reduces to van Emden and Kowalski's xpoint semantics in denite logic programs [34] .
For positive disjunctive programs, our xpoint construction characterizes Sakama's possible model semantics [29] 3 and Minker's minimal model semantics [24] . Let PM P (resp. MM P ) be the set of all possible models (resp. minimal models) of a positive disjunctive program P . Theorem 2.9 Let P be a positive disjunctive program. Then, (i) PM P = (T P " !).
(ii) MM P = min((T P " !)).
The above (i) also presents that for a positive extended disjunctive program P , the xpoint closure (T P " !) characterizes the paraconsistent extension of the possible model semantics. We do not discuss here detailed denition and properties of the possible model semantics and refer the reader to the literature [29, 31] .
Paraconsistent Stable Models
An extended disjunctive program is a nite set of clauses of the form:
where L i 's are literals and not is a connective representing default negation.
The notions of heads, bodies, disjunctive clauses, and integrity constraints are dened in the same way as those of positive extended disjunctive programs. In an extended disjunctive program, the notion of interpretations and satisfaction of literals and clauses are dened in the same manner as in Denition 2.1 except that for each formula not L, we include the additional statements:
The rst condition presents that if L is false in I, its default negation not L holds in I; else if L is undened in I, not L holds in I as negation as failure to prove; otherwise I 6 j= not L. The second condition gives the counterpart statement.
The notions of (p-minimal) models can be dened in the same way as in Section 2.1.
The paraconsistent stable model semantics of an extended disjunctive program is dened as follows. Denition 3.1 Let P be an extended disjunctive program and I be a subset of L P . The reduct of P with respect to I is the positive extended disjunctive program P I such that a clause
is in P I i there is a ground clause of the form (2) Proof. Let I be a p-stable model of a program P . Assume that there is a p-minimal model J of P such that J I. Since J is a model of P and satises each clause (2) in P , and fL m+1 ; . . . ; L n g \ I = ; and J I imply fL m+1 ; . . . ; L n g \ J = ;, J also satises each clause (3) in P I . Thus J is a model of P I , and since I is a p-minimal model of P I , J I implies J = I.
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The converse of the above proposition does not hold in general. For instance, in Example 3.2, fa; bg is the p-minimal model of P , but not p-stable.
Fixpoint Semantics of Extended Disjunctive Programs
In this section, we characterize the p-stable models of extended disjunctive programs using the xpoint semantics presented in the previous section. To this end, we rst introduce a program transformation which translates an extended disjunctive program into a semantically equivalent positive extended disjunctive program. 4
Denition 3.2 Let P be an extended disjunctive program. Then its epistemic transformation is dened as the positive extended disjunctive program P obtained from P by replacing each clause of the form (2) in P containing default negation:
with the following not-free clauses in P :
L i i for i = 1; . . . ; l ; (5) i^Lj for i = 1; . . . ; l and j = m + 1; . . . ; n ; (6) i L i^k for i = 1; . . . ; l and k = 1; . . . ; l :
In particular, each integrity constraint containing default negation is transformed into
Note here that each not-free clause in P is included in P as it is.
In the epistemic transformation, the newly introduced atom KL j means that L j is believed. With this epistemic reading, each default negation not L j in the body of a clause is rewritten in :KL j and shifted to the head of the clause. In the transformed clause, i is a newly introduced atom not appearing elsewhere in P and is uniquely associated with each ground instance of a clause (2) from P . 5 An intuitive reading of the transformed clauses is that if L l+1 ; . . . ; L m are true, then some L i (1 i l) becomes true via i when L m+1 ; . . . ; L n are not true; otherwise, some L j (m + 1 j n) is believed. The clause (7) has an eect to associate i with L i whenever L i is true and another disjunct L k is derived from (4) via k . 6 In this way, every extended disjunctive program P is transformed into a positive extended disjunctive program P . Then we can construct the xpoint of P as presented in the previous section.
Let I be an interpretation of P . Then I is called canonical if KL 2 I implies L 2 I for any L 2 L P . That is, in a canonical interpretation each believed literal has a justication. Given a set of interpretations I P , let obj c (I P ) = fI \ L P j I 2 I P and I is canonical g:
Then the next theorem provides the xpoint characterization of p-stable models in extended disjunctive programs. Theorem 3.2 Let P be an extended disjunctive program and PST P be the set of all p-stable models of P . Then, PST P = obj c (min((T P " !))) :
Proof. Suppose that I is in obj c (min((T P " !))). Let I be a canonical interpretation in min((T P " !)) such that I \ L P = I. Then, for each ground clause of the form (2) . Let J = I n fL i 2 ; i 2 g. Then the interpretation J satises all the clauses (4), (5), (6), (7) in P . This contradicts the fact that I is a minimal set satisfying each clause in P . Then I is also a p-minimal model of P I , hence a p-stable model of P .
Conversely, suppose that I is a p-stable model of P . Then, for each clause C of the form (2) (5), (6) , and (7) from P , and by the construction of I 0 , I 0 2 (T P " !). Now let us dene I = I [ S where S is a minimal subset of I [ I K such that each i or KL j is chosen in a way that I satises every clause in P . Note that for each literal KL in I , L 2 I by denition, so L 2 I . Hence I is canonical. Next assume that there exists J 2 (T P " !) such that J I . Since we have dened I as a minimal set with respect to the atoms from I [ I K , the inclusion relation implies J \ L P I \ L P . Then 9L i 2 I n J . In this case, there is a clause (4) in P such that fL l+1 ; . . . ; L m g J , i 2 I n J , KL j 2 J for some 1 i l 7 When a clause (2) contains no not, fLl+1; . . . ; Lmg I implies Li 2 I (1 i l) as a special case of (i). and m + 1 j n. Since J I , KL j 2 I . As I is canonical, KL j 2 I implies L j 2 I . But this is impossible from the condition (6). Thus, there is no J which is smaller than I , hence I 2 min((T P " !)). Since I is canonical, I 2 obj c (min((T P " !))). 2 Corollary 3.3 Let P be an extended logic program. Then, PST P = obj c ((T P " !)) :
Proof. By Theorem 3.2, obj c (min((T P " !))) is the set of all p-stable models of P . Since I 2 obj c (min((T P " !))) implies I 2 obj c ((T P " !)), we show that the converse is also true. Assume that the converse does not hold. That is, there is a non-minimal set I 2 obj c ((T P " !)) and 9J 2 obj c (min((T P " !))) such that J I. In this case, there exists a literal L such that L 2 I n J. Let min((T P " !)) = ff:a; a; :c; g; fb; a; :c; g; f:a; Kcg; fb; Kcgg; and thus, obj c (min((T P " !))) = ff:a; a; :cg; fb; a; :cgg is the set of p-stable models of P .
For normal disjunctive programs, our xpoint construction also characterizes the possible model semantics of [31] 8 and the disjunctive stable model semantics of [27] . Let PM P (resp. ST P ) be the set of all possible models (resp. stable models) of P . 9 Since the denition of the p-stable models coincides with that of stable models in normal disjunctive programs, the next results follow from Theorem 3.2, Corollary 3.3, and the result presented in [31] . Theorem 3.4 Let P be a normal disjunctive program. Then, (i) PM P = obj c ((T P " !)).
(ii) ST P = obj c (min((T P " !))).
In particular, for a normal logic program P , PM P = ST P = obj c ((T P " !)).
The above results are extensions of the results in Theorem 2.9.
Connection to the Answer Set Semantics
For extended disjunctive programs, Gelfond and Lifschitz have introduced the answer set semantics in [15] . The answer sets are dened in the same manner as p-stable models in Denition 3.1 except that the denition of p-minimal models of a positive extended disjunctive program P I is changed in a way that I = L P if a model I contains a pair of complementary literals L and :L. For instance, in Example 3.1, P has two inconsistent p-stable models, while it has the unique answer set L P . Thus p-stable models are paraconsistent, while answer sets are not. In this section, we present a connection between the p-stable model semantics and the answer set semantics in extended disjunctive programs. As presented above, the essential dierence between the two semantics is the treatment of inconsistency. Then we relate p-stable models to answer sets by trivializing inconsistent p-stable models.
Let us consider a program P tr obtained from P by incorporating the trivialization rule: N L^:L (8) for all literals L and N from L P . Then the relationship between answer sets and p-stable models of extended disjunctive programs is as follows.
Theorem 3.5 Let P be an extended disjunctive program. Then I is an answer set of P i I is a p-stable model of P tr .
Proof. Since consistent answer sets coincide with consistent p-stable models, the result follows when I is a consistent answer set. Otherwise, suppose the case that P has the contradictory answer set L P . Then, by the denition of answer sets, the positive extended disjunctive program P L P has the answer set L P . In this case, P L P has no consistent p-minimal model, but an inconsistent p-minimal model. Thus, in the presence of the trivialization rule (8), P L P tr has the p-minimal model containing every literal N from L P . Hence, L P is the unique p-stable model of P tr . On the other hand, if I is an inconsistent p-stable model of P tr , it contains every literal N from L P by (8) . In this case, L P is the p-minimal model of P L P tr , and thus each p-minimal model of P L P contains a pair of complementary literals. Hence, L P is the unique answer set of P . 2
Corollary 3.6 Let P be an extended disjunctive program and AS P be the set of all answer sets of P . Then, AS P = obj c (min((T P tr " !))) where P tr is the epistemic transformation of P tr . In particular, when P is an extended logic program, AS P = obj c ((T P tr " !)).
The above theorem presents that we can easily simulate the \classical" meaning of logic programming by a simple program transformation. Note that without the trivialization rule, there is no one-to-one correspondence between inconsistent p-stable models and the answer set L P in general. has the answer set L P , while it has no p-stable model.
The example illustrates that a program possibly has an inconsistent pstable model even when there is no answer set of the program. When a program has no p-stable model, on the other hand, the program has either no answer set or the trivial answer set L P . Since the answer set semantics brings no useful information, the absence of p-stable models in this case is not a serious drawback. As a result, we can conclude that the paraconsistent stable model semantics is more useful than the answer set semantics.
P-stable models of an extended disjunctive program are also characterized by stable models of the positive form of the program. A positive form of an extended disjunctive program P is dened as a normal disjunctive program P + which is obtained by replacing each negative literal :L in P with a corresponding newly introduced atom L 0 in P + . Let I + be a model of such P + .
Then the following relation holds by denition. Proposition 3.7 Let P be an extended disjunctive program and P + be its positive form. Then I is a p-stable model of P i I + is a stable model of P + .
Note that in case of the answer set semantics the above relation holds only for consistent answer sets [15] . 4 Reasoning with Inconsistency
This section presents applications of paraconsistent semantics for reasoning with inconsistent information.
Preferred Stable Models
In the previous section, we have dened the paraconsistent stable model semantics by the collection of all p-stable models. However, when a program has consistent models as well as inconsistent ones, a rational reasoner may prefer consistent models to inconsistent ones and consider truth values only in consistent models.
Example 4.1 Recall the program P in Example 3.3:
f :a _ b ; a :c; :c not c g; which has two p-stable models fa; :a; :cg and fa; b; :cg. In this case, however, it seems natural to prefer the consistent model fa; b; :cg and conclude the truth of a and b.
When an extended disjunctive program has consistent p-stable models, we distinguish these consistent p-stable models as preferred p-stable models. Thus preferred p-stable models characterize \consistent" meaning of a program. In fact, preferred p-stable models coincide with consistent answer sets of extended disjunctive programs. Theorem 4.1 Let P be an extended disjunctive program. Then I is a preferred p-stable model of P i I is a consistent answer set of P .
Proof. Since consistent answer sets coincide with consistent p-stable models, the result follows. Then P has the p-stable model fa; b; :b; dg. However, the truth of a is less credible than the truth of d, since a is derived through the contradictory fact b.
In order to distinguish such suspicious facts from others, we present suspicious reasoning under the paraconsistent stable model semantics. To this end, we rst introduce two new truth values st and sf, which respectively denote suspiciously true and suspiciously false. These newly introduced values together with the values in IV constitute a lattice of six-valued logic V I such that ? sx x > for x 2 ft; fg (Figure 2 ). Given an extended disjunctive program P and its epistemic transformation P , let us consider the xpoint closure SPST P = obj c (min((T s P " !))). We call SPST P the suspicious p-stable models of P . Thus suspicious p-stable models can distinguish information derived through contradictory facts from others. Clearly, suspicious p-stable models reduce to p-stable models in the absence of suspicious information.
Note that a proved fact is considered to be suspicious if every proof of the fact includes inconsistent information. Then if an interpretation includes both L and L s , it means that there is a proof of L which depends on no inconsistent information. In this case, by taking the least upper bound of t and st, the truth value of L becomes t. There is an extended disjunctive program which has no p-stable model but still contains useful information. For instance, in Example 3.2, P has no p-stable model but it seems reasonable to conclude the truth of b. Roughly speaking, incoherency arises when a literal is implied by its default negation in a program. Since incoherency is viewed as a kind of inconsistency, it is desirable to provide a framework which is paraconsistent for such incoherency. In this section, we introduce the notion of semi-stable models which is paraconsistent for incoherent programs.
To present incoherent facts, we rst introduce ve extra truth values bt, bf, b>, tcb, and fcb which respectively denote believed true, believed false, Next let I P be a set of interpretations of a program P obtained by the epistemic transformation of an extended disjunctive program P . Then an interpretation I 2 I P is said maximally canonical if there is no interpretation J 2 I P such that fKL j KL 2 J and L 6 2 J g fKL j KL 2 I and L 6 2 I g. That is, a maximally canonical interpretation is an interpretation such that the canonical condition is satised as much as possible. In particular, if I P contains an interpretation I which is canonical, it is also maximally canonical. Now let obj mc (I P ) = fI \ L P j I 2 I P and I is maximally canonical g: Theorem 4.4 Let P be an extended disjunctive program. Then, any interpretation included in SST P = obj mc (min((T P " !))) is a model of P . Proof. By denition, each maximally canonical interpretation I included in min((T P " !)) is a model of P . Then, for each transformed clauses (4) and (5) (2) in P . Else when L j 6 2 I , (i) if :L j 6 2 I , the truth value of L j is bt or b>, then I 6 j= not L j . (ii) Else if :L j 2 I , the truth value of L j becomes fcb, then I 6 j= not L j . In either case, I satises the clause (2) in P . Therefore, I satises each clause in P . Hence, I \ L P , which is obtained from I by removing every i , is also a model of P . 2
We call models SST P the semi-stable models of P .
The notion of semi-stable models reduces to p-stable models in coherent programs.
Corollary 4.5 Let P be a coherent program. Then its semi-stable models coincide with the p-stable models.
Proof. When min((T P " !)) contains canonical interpretations, they are also maximally canonical. Hence the result follows from denition. 2
The existence of semi-stable models is guaranteed for any program which has models. Theorem 4.6 When a program has a model, it has a semi-stable model.
Proof.
When a program P has a model, it is easy to see that P also has a model. Then the closure min((T P " !)) contains models which are maximally canonical, hence SST P is not empty. 2
Thus incoherent programs get the meaning by considering semi-stable models. which contains the unique semi-stable model of P such that shave(N; C) and mayor(C) are true, while shave(N; N) is believed true.
Note that the above program has neither standard two-valued stable models nor answer sets.
In the incoherent program f a not a g, it is known that interpretations \oscillate" between ; and fag under the stable class semantics [3] . Then it is interesting to observe that the truth value I(a) = bt in its semi-stable model correspondingly lies between ? and t. 5 Related Work
A framework of paraconsistent logic programming is rstly developed by Blair and Subrahmanian [5] in the context of annotated logic programs. They employ Belnap's four-valued logic as a theoretical basis, but their framework does not treat default negation in a program. Fitting [12] provides a general framework for logic programming in terms of bilattices, but he does not discuss programs containing two kinds of negation. Kifer and Lozinskii [21] extend Blair and Subrahmanian's annotated logic programming framework to a theory possibly containing default negation, and Wagner [35] also develops a theory of inconsistent logic programs with two kinds of negation. Compared with our approach, they do not treat disjunctions in a program and the underlying logics presented in these literature are dierent from our stable model semantics. Subrahmanian [32] has extended the framework of [5] to programs containing disjunctive information. However, he does not treat default negation in a program. He also provides a xpoint semantics of paraconsistent disjunctive programs based on Minker and Rajasekar's model state xpoint semantics [25] . By contrast, our xpoint semantics is based on the manipulation of Herbrand interpretations and directly computes the paraconsistent minimal/stable models. Lu and Henschen [23] consider specifying the closed world assumption in paraconsistent denite and disjunctive logic programs. However, they neither consider programs containing two kinds of negation nor develop any xpoint theory for disjunctive programs. A xpoint semantics of disjunctive programs is also developed by Fernandez et al. [10] . Their approach is close to ours but dierent in the following points. First, their xpoint closure computes stable models of normal disjunctive programs, while ours computes p-stable models as well as answer sets of extended disjunctive programs. Second, our xpoint closure computes not only stable models but also possible models of disjunctive programs. Inoue and Sakama [20] also present yet another xpoint semantics which characterizes the answer set semantics of extended disjunctive programs, while they do not treat paraconsistent semantics nor the possible model semantics.
Paraconsistent stable model semantics is also proposed by several researchers. Pimentel and Rodi [28] , Grant and Subrahmanian [17] , and Wagner [36] study paraconsistent stable model semantics from dierent viewpoints. The dierences between these approaches and ours are as follows. First, their paraconsistent stable model semantics are dened for extended logic programs and do not treat disjunctive information in a program. Second, they do not provide any mechanism to compute their stable models, while our xpoint computation realizes constructive computation of paraconsistent stable models. Third, we have introduced the notion of semi-stable models which are paraconsistent for incoherent programs, while they do not discuss the issue of handling incoherency. Recently, Fitting [13] provided a framework of stable model semantics in terms of bilattices, but it does not treat disjunctive programs. Sakama [30] has also developed a paraconsistent well-founded semantics for extended logic programs and disjunctive programs, which is dierent from the stable model approach presented in this paper.
The paraconsistent semantics presented in this paper is intended to localize inconsistent information in a program. There is an alternative approach which tries to detect the source of inconsistency and recover the consistency of a program. Generally speaking, however, it is a hard task to automatically resolve inconsistency in a program. When inconsistency arises from default assumptions, Pereira et al. [26] and Dung et al. [8] present methods of removing the inconsistency by preferring a fact that does not depend on any default assumption. However, their approaches are of no use in a program where inconsistency is derived without default assumptions. Kowalski and Sadri [22] resolve contradiction by giving a higher priority to one of the conicting conclusions as an exception, but such an approach generally requires one to specify a preference for each individual rule. Inoue [18] and Baral et al. [2] consider the meaning of an inconsistent program as a collection of maximally consistent subsets of the program, but such a collection exponentially grows according to the increase of inconsistent information. 6 Conclusion This paper has presented declarative semantics of extended disjunctive programs. We have introduced the paraconsistent minimal and stable model semantics for extended disjunctive programs based on lattice-structured multivalued logics. The paraconsistent semantics are characterized by a new xpoint semantics of extended disjunctive programs. We have also discussed applications of the paraconsistent semantics for reasoning with inconsistency. The paraconsistent minimal/stable model semantics are natural extensions of the usual minimal/stable model semantics for disjunctive programs, and compared with Gelfond and Lifschitz's answer set semantics, the proposed semantics do not trivialize a program in the presence of inconsistent information. The paraconsistent semantics presented in this paper generalize previous studies of paraconsistent logic programming and provide a uniform framework of logic programming possibly containing inconsistent information, disjunctive information, integrity constraints, and both explicit and default negation in a program. The xpoint semantics presented in this paper characterizes operational aspects of such programs and is also implemented using bottom-up model generation techniques as presented in [19] .
